Internecine Secret Service Wars Revisited: The Intelligence Career of Count Gerhard von Schwerin, 1945 Schwerin, -1956 After several weeks of negative newspaper publicity surrounding Konrad Adenauer's security adviser, the former General der Panzertruppe Gerhard Graf von Schwerin, 1 the Federal Chancellor's Office in Bonn issued a brief press statement on 28 October 1950 that the Chancellor's adviser on technical security questions had undertaken activities in some areas which went beyond the tasks accorded to him. While phrased in diplomatic language, the statement concluded by announcing he had resigned.
2 So far, in both memoir material and general historical works, 4 the ex-Wehrmacht general has gone down in history as a man who appeared from obscurity on 24 May 1950 to become Adenauer's adviser on security planning, only to disappear very rapidly into obscurity once again when, following indiscretions at a press conference, he was dismissed unceremoniously by the Chancellor from his position. Recently Schwerin has become much more than footnote in contemporary history, though, due to a bitter dispute which has divided the city of Aachen.
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The controversy has centred on the execution of two fourteen-year-old boys for looting by members of the 116th Panzer Division in the city on 1 September 1944, the division commanded at the time by none other than Gerhard Graf von Schwerin. What has made this case so explosive -even though the evidence did not link Schwerin directly with the shooting -was that it had been largely accepted in MGZ 71 (2012) Alaric Searle Aachen that Schwerin had sought to save the city from destruction on 1 September 1944 by attempting to surrender it to the advancing American forces. This had earned him the title of the ›Ritter von Aachen‹ which later evolved into the ›Retter von Aachen‹. Schwerin's name was entered in the ›Golden Book‹ of the city in 1957, and a street was named after him in 196. But as a result of a report published by three historians at the Technical University Aachen, it was decided in 2007 by the Stadtrat of the city that the street should be renamed. 6 Still, while the 2007 report was thoroughly researched, it concentrated on 1 September 1944, referring to other aspects of Schwerin's career only in a rather limited fashion. Schwerin's behaviour and statements in relation to Aachen cannot be fully understood, however, without taking into consideration other crucial elements in his biography, not least of all in relation to his post-war career. His own later attitude to his part in the events of 1 September 1944 was evidently influenced by the dynamics of veterans' politics, the controversy over rearmament and, most importantly, by the role he and other former generals played in the early security and intelligence politics of the Federal Republic. The public demolition of Schwerin's reputation is, in other words, not only of relevance for the continuing controversy over the crimes of the Wehrmacht in the Second World War.
Remarkably, historians have so far made nothing other than passing reference to Schwerin's career in intelligence after 1950, even though his fall from grace in October 1950 has often been explained in terms of British and American secret service competition. 7 This is in part due to the fact that in the historiography on the political battle over West German rearmament, particularly in the period from 1949 to 1956, little attention has been paid to the importance of intelligence organisations and the function of intelligence in general. While some recent work has been completed on the Gehlen Organisation, 8 even specific studies on the early battles between competing intelligence organisations have tended to focus on the three most controversial figures: Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz, Otto John and Reinhard Gehlen. 9 The lack of research has left not only a missing chapter in the very unusual This article aims to fill a gap in the biography of Gerhard Graf von Schwerin, but will demonstrate at the same time the way in which intelligence affairs played a significant part in security policy-making in Adenauer's Republic. 10 It is directed in the first instance towards an examination of Gerhard Graf von Schwerin's relationship with British and American intelligence and its relevance to the internecine war waged between him and Reinhard Gehlen. In order to relate what is an extremely complex tale of intelligence cooperation and competition, the analysis of Schwerin's post-war intelligence career will examine: first, his immediate postwar interest in intelligence from May 1945 to May 1950; second, the intelligence dimension to his period as Adenauer's security adviser from 24 May to 28 October 1950; third, his activities after 1950, partly as a paid operative of the Central Intelligence Agency; and, fourth, his work as an informal adviser to two leading Federal German politicians. An examination of the general's post-war intelligence activities promises to throw new light on the nature of security and intelligence politics, including the role of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the US Army Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC), in the early Federal Republic of Germany, raising as well a number of intriguing questions about the reputation of the ›Ret-ter von Aachen‹.
I. Prelude, May 1945-May 1950
The first observation to be made about Schwerin's post-war career is that evidence exists of his desire to become involved in the Allied occupation regime well before May 1950 -specifically in the field of intelligence. As early as May 1945 Schwerin had written to the British Major-General, Kenneth Strong, Dwight D. Eisenhower's head of intelligence at Allied Supreme Headquarters, drawing his attention to a shadowy SS organisation, known by its cover-name as the Havel Institut, claiming that its agents may have still been operating in Russia. Although a G-2 Counter-Intelligence officer at Supreme Allied Headquarters thought initially that Schwerin's letter ›appears to offer opportunities of further exploitation‹, the The approach made by him was in the form of a paper proposing the establishment of an intelligence service. The document was given to a CIC Technical Specialist belonging to CIC Region IX (Bremen) by Schwerin. Region IX submitted the proposal to CIC Headquarters in Region VIII (Berlin) as part of a top secret report, dated 1 July 1948, accompanied by seven annexes detailing Schwerin's military career. His proposal was subsequently discussed by a Technical Specialist and a Special Agent on 4 October 1948. 1 The Executive Officer who signed the report concluded with the remark: ›The Technical Specialist, Region IX, is submitting the above because he believes that SCHWERIN's plan has merit and deserves careful consideration by higher authorities.‹ 14 The basic idea behind Schwerin's proposal was that, in the face of an on-going Communist propaganda campaign, and as a result of mistakes made by the occupying Western powers, it was an urgent task ›to regain the confidence of the German people‹. He felt that the Germans would need to be allowed to create their own intelligence service. The idea was not a fully functioning secret service, but rather an organisation designed to assist and support Allied military government, to be staffed and run solely by Germans. With the aim of conducting undercover research into German political attitudes under the protective hand of the Western Allies, he recommended, in addition to a central office in Frankfurt/Main, the creation of regional offices in Munich, Stuttgart, Cologne and Hamburg. 15 The plan and other documents relating to Schwerin's military career were studied in some detail by CIC. It seems likely that it was at this point that US military intelligence became aware of Schwerin's potential as a pro-Allied intelligence asset. 16 Given that Schwerin spent most of the Second World War as an accomplished front-line commander -he was awarded the Iron Cross (First and Second Class), and the Knight's Cross with oak leaves and swords -where did this interest in intelligence affairs originate? He had attended the Kriegsakademie in Berlin from October 19 to October 195, while in 198/9 he had served in the Army General Staff Department ›Foreign Armies West‹, basically an assignment in military intelligence. He had undertaken a trip to the United States for several months from late 190 to early 191, which he funded himself, and spoke both English and French reasonably fluently. Thus, during his pre-war career, which saw his rise from Ober- leutnant to Oberstleutnant, he had received a degree of military training which qualified him for the acquisition and analysis of military information. What also appears to be in little doubt is that Schwerin was anything other than a typical officer: he was a soldier who often came into conflict with the military authorities. 17 There was, though, a further dimension, namely his apparently pro-Western and anti-Nazi attitude, a point which the authors of the 2007 report on Schwerin's role in Aachen 1944 hotly dispute. According to them, a trip which Schwerin undertook to Britain in the summer of 199, which was later portrayed as an attempt to identify the limits of British appeasement policy or warn about German intentions, cannot be identified as such other than by relying on Schwerin's own testimony. Moreover, they argue more generally that there is a complete lack of evidence to substantiate Schwerin's post-1945 claims about his critical stance towards the National Socialist regime. 18 Certainly, there is no absolutely conclusive evidence that he was removed from the General Staff as a result of his trip to England in 199; nonetheless, there are several intelligence documents attesting to this interpretation, produced by individuals other than Schwerin himself. 19 The problem with the repeated scepticism towards Schwerin's statements about his own biography by Rass and his co-authors is that they have not consulted key British and American documents.
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The British and American files on his trip to England in 199 take on a particular significance here. Schwerin arrived at Folkestone on 14 June 199 and, although kept under close surveillance by M.I.5, he did make contact with a number of prominent industrial and political figures. Although M.I.5 assumed he had been sent ›to get atmosphere and information about the state of public opinion‹ in Britain, to find out more on the strength of the Royal Air Force and to ascertain British intentions in the Eastern Mediterranean, it seems he did make a positive impression on his British interlocutors. 21 After the war, due to his continued detention as a POW, some of those he had met intervened with the American authori- 17 Although a biography of Schwerin is still to be written, substantive details can be found in Rass, et al., General Graf von Schwerin (see n. 6), esp. pp. 19 According to an interrogation report on one of Schwerin's adjutants, the general had a thoroughly anti-Nazi attitude, disobeyed orders and was more concerned about the lives of his soldiers than military decorations. The fact the interrogation was conducted shortly after the officer's capture strengthens its credibility as a source. of a leading 20 July conspirator, Achim Oster, called for the creation of a Federal intelligence agency, referring to it as ›an office for the protection of the constitution‹. His main concern was that a national agency be created to carry out surveillance within both German states. Schwerin approved of Oster's three-page memorandum, adding to it that he thought Oster himself ought to play a part in the ›Office for the Protection of the Constitution‹. He argued, however, that there should be a political information service for the Federal Chancellor which would be separate from the ›Office for the Protection of the Constitution‹, and here he identified Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz as the most suitable candidate. Moreover, he suggested that Oster could serve as a bridge between the main intelligence service and the smaller office of Heinz.
2 Oster's paper and Schwerin's addendum to it were a direct response to the latter's first meeting with Adenauer on 24 May 1950 and, at the same time, the de facto founding of an intelligence service within the Zentrale für Heimatdienst.
In the following two months, a battle had to be waged by Schwerin and his two new intelligence recruits for financial resources in order that both Oster and Heinz could begin expanding their operations. 4 Nonetheless, despite the shoestring nature of both intelligence cells, by August 1950 Heinz was already generating a certain amount of material on military developments in Eastern Germany. 5 The two secret service units within the embryonic Zentrale für Heimatdienst were, though, not the only sources of intelligence which Schwerin was able to call on. On 5 August, the intelligence coordinator for the US High Commissioner in Germany, a certain ›Mr Hermsdorf‹ (an obvious alias), informed both Schwerin and Oster at a meeting that John J. McCloy had agreed to allow Schwerin access to official information and US military intelligence. This understanding was made dependent upon the agreement of the Federal Chancellor on behalf of whom Schwerin would receive the information.
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It should also be borne in mind that the first shot in the impending intelligence war between Gehlen and Schwerin had already been fired on 22 July. During a meeting with General George P. Hays, Deputy US High Commissioner for Germany, Schwerin had reported that he had heard from a member of Gehlen's organisation that there were unreliable individuals working in it due to the speed with which it had been created. An internal purge of the organisation was urgently required. Since it could not be expected that Gehlen would present any reform plans, For an outline of the evolution of the intelligence cell in Schwerin's office and its successor organization in the Blank Office, see Krüger, Amt Blank (see n. 28), pp. 71-7. Schwerin even asked whether Hays would be willing to accept his own plan. 7 Schwerin's major problem, though, was that -unbeknown to him -a number of former generals and staff officers had formed a conspiratorial group at the beginning of the year, which included two former generals close to Reinhard Gehlen, Adolf Heusinger and Hermann Foertsch, and Eberhard Wildermuth of the Free Democratic Party (FDP), the Federal Housing Minister in Adenauer's first cabinet. 8 This group quickly established their own agenda, which aimed to promote rearmament and secure key positions of influence within the new state bureaucracy for those from within their circle or approved by them. Still, correspondence between Gehlen and Wildermuth shows that in early 1950 the Gehlen Organisation was extremely worried about its financial situation, it was anxious to receive toplevel information from the centre of government and had clearly become agitated by the lack of any clear commitment to put the organisation on the payroll of the Federal government. Political discussions about the creation of ›Offices for the Protection of the Constitution‹ in each of the Federal states alarmed Gehlen, even though these were intended from the outset to be responsible for domestic security affairs.
9 Letters complaining about Schwerin's suitability for the post of security adviser were circulated to those who could make use of them, particularly Wildermuth. 40 The whispering against Schwerin by former officers was in essence a well-organised defamation campaign. 41 As the domestic-political situation became ever more uncomfortable for Adenauer in the course of September and October 1950, there were a number of reasons why the Chancellor felt it politic to sack Schwerin. The official reason given was a press conference held on 19 October which had led to sensational newspaper reports; under pressure from Adenauer, Schwerin had ›resigned‹ on 28 October. 42 Writing to his friend Geyr von Schweppenburg over a decade later, Schwerin noted there were a number of explanations for his dismissal, ›although I cannot prove any of them‹. In addition to the domestic-political background, the creation of a small, independent intelligence service, which had within fourteen days identified the Russian offensive plans, angered Gehlen enormously. According to Schwerin, ›The immediate undercover work by Gehlen [...] proved itself to be rapid and extremely effective in the discrediting and defaming of my office and my person to the Chancellor and the leading political circles.‹ Then, as a result of the failure of the New York conference of the three Allied powers to agree to West German rearmament, and the passing of the immediate crisis in Korea, Adenauer's political position became delicate, so dismissing Schwerin offered a welcome route out of the corner in which he found himself. 4 How accurate, then, was Schwerin's version of events? Was the Gehlen Organisation attempting to force him from office? Or, was he trying to push a British solution to rearmament? The principal source for historians who have argued that Adenauer suspected Schwerin of being too close to the British is the record of a cabinet meeting held on 17 October 1950. Yet, immediately before Adenauer claimed that Schwerin was ›becoming too big for his boots‹, and that the ›English were attempting to draw him towards them‹, he also remarked that he wanted to place Schwerin under the authority of a CDU politician, Theodor Blank, who was soon to replace the general completely. There was no mention at this stage of dismissing Schwerin from Federal service. Then, later in the same cabinet meeting, Eberhard Wildermuth intervened, criticising the choice of Blank and arguing that the ›technical aspects‹ of rearmament would need to be solved, concluding with an attack on Schwerin. 44 Significantly, documents in Wildermuth's papers provide clear evidence of the extent to which Schwerin was under fire from the Gehlen Organisation. As early as mid-August, the Organisation had communicated to Wildermuth that Gehlen was convinced that the former had ›exceeded the authority accorded to him‹ [!] . The letter contained menacing demands for a written denial that Wildermuth was involved in Schwerin's ›dirty double cross‹, clear threats that if Schwerin's activities were not controlled Gehlen would intervene, and it was also intimated that Schwerin would be placed under surveillance. 45 Indeed, not only was Wildermuth's secretary keeping tabs on Schwerin in Bonn, the Gehlen Organisation was soon doing everything it could to influence the composition of the experts' committee, which after some delay finally met clandestinely at a monastery in Himmerod in October. 46 So, if there is evidence to support Schwerin's later claim that he was driven from office by the Gehlen Organisation, what does the documentary record tell us about the attitude of the Western Allies towards Schwerin? Certainly, in early July 1950 Schwerin appears to have been the cause of ruffled feathers between the British and the Americans. On 6 July, the American Ambassador in London wrote to the US Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, reporting on conversations with the British Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, and Ivo Mallett of the German Section of the Foreign Office. The Americans expressed their concern over reports ›of unilateral discussions between HMG representatives and Germans concerning German police force and even rearmament of Germany.‹ In addition to the views of General Brian Robertson, Ambassador Douglas referred to ›conversations which von Schwerin was reported to have had with British officials in London.‹ Two days later, Attlee denied that there had been ›any British discussions of remilitarization with Adenauer‹, but also pointed out that Kirkpatrick's conversations with Schwerin ›had been informal and had occurred because von Schwerin had been [a] useful prewar intelligence contact‹. 47 In a draft of a proposed written reply (which was not sent) by Attlee to Douglas, however, the implication is very much that Kirkpatrick, who had been appointed British High Commissioner for Germany on 24 June, had spoken recently with Schwerin in Germany and it was stated that the contents of the conversation had been communicated to the US High Commissioner, John J. McCloy . 48 Yet the Americans had referred to conversations in London, most probably a reference to Schwerin's visit in April, although they did not mention the month. Given the efforts which were being undertaken by the Count's German opponents to discredit him, was it perhaps part of the Gehlen Organisation's plan to discredit him by sowing seeds of distrust with the Americans? There is even evidence of nervousness about Schwerin among Foreign Office officials in Whitehall at the end of August when they wrote to the High Commission at Wahnerheide, asking: ›We should be glad of your comments on the genuineness of von Schwerin's anti-Nazi convictions‹. 49 While the negative atmosphere of early July was soon forgotten, the fact remains that Schwerin did have British intelligence connections. This is exemplified by the visit paid to Schwerin in Bonn on 28 September 1950 by William CavendishBentinck, who had been chairman of the Joint Intelligence Bureau during the Second World War, and at which confidential questions relating to rearmament were discussed. 50 More important was his close relationship to Major-General Kenneth Strong, who had retired from the British Army and was by this time the director of the Joint Intelligence Bureau in London. 51 A report made by Strong on a visit to Germany in the second week of October 1950 contains a considerable amount of highly sensitive material on, among other subjects, the clandestine conference of former military officers at Himmerod. Strong noted in his report: ›The conversations on events inside Germany were really a by-product of my visit and the information comes practically entirely from Graf von Schwerin It is felt that the British wish to avoid war at any cost, at this time, because it might shatter the empire forever. They are probably fundamentally, though not openly, opposed to any significant German rearmament and their recent moves may be paradoxical -i.e., by getting the remilitarization ball rolling, they may intend to ultimately suppress any realistic remilitarization by holding out for a force limited to 5000-10 000 men.
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Yet such claims probably reflected concerns among circles of former German military officers, or could have been part of the Gehlen campaign to undermine Schwerin's position by reinforcing latent American worries. The statement as a summary of official British attitudes towards rearmament was accurate up to a point, 55 although the crucial question is whether Schwerin was viewed by the Americans as intent on supporting British policy objectives.
The fact that Schwerin was able to attend a dinner at the house of the Deputy British High Commissioner, Christopher Steel, on 11 October with Kenneth Strong, together with the American general George Hays, points more though towards Anglo-American cooperation in the discussion of the security issues surrounding Germany. 56 While not clear-cut, the evidence available does suggest that high-level American military policy-makers took Schwerin's views seriously and, hence, any suspicions about his loyalty cannot have been too great. In early October 1950, Schwerin's opinion that the Germans might agree to an American commander for their military contingent, so long as he was a ›name‹ general of high rank, was not only forwarded to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Omar Bradley, on 11 October, but also to the Commander-in-Chief, US European Command (EUCOM), General Thomas Handy.
57 That Schwerin wanted to pursue rearmament by first setting up border police units, and by making use of the service units as a building block for future military forces, was hardly an unreasonable course to follow given the non-existent state of West German armed forces. 58 Thus, on the basis of the evidence available, it is an obvious conclusion that in the latter half of 1950 Schwerin cooperated with both the British and American military authorities. After all, his first memorandum on emergency planning was considered collectively by all three Allied High Commissioners at a meeting on 20 July.
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As a result of his high-level contacts, the US Army Counter Intelligence Corps not surprisingly developed an interest in him during the course of 1950. Their aim seems to have been to plant a source close to him to monitor his opinions and activities. A barely legible CIC incoming message marked ›PRIORITY‹, from Region VIII, the Berlin Headquarters, undated but clearly written in the summer of 1950, talks of ›definite objections [...] to Reg III interviewing source‹. A special agent was said to be flying to Frankfurt on 14 August for an interview with the source, the source obviously being Schwerin. The message stated: ›This will be crucial meeting to determine success or failure of penetration effort.‹ 60 An evaluation sheet for a report (which has not been released) provides further evidence of CIC interest in Schwerin. Dated 1 December 1950, it was sent by CIC to the Operations Branch (presumably of EUCOM), the subject being the ›Dismissal of Count von Schwerin‹, the original report being dated 22 November 1950. Described as a Priority I category, it was ›late but useable‹, the reliability had been ›confirmed by other sources‹ and was ›probably true‹. The information in ›relation to target‹ had resulted from a ›partial penetration‹.
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What emerges from the evidence available is that CIC wished to keep their eyes on him. There are several reports submitted by a source identified as P-909 from Region III, the Frankfurt area. One reason why CIC had such an interest becomes clear when a memorandum is considered, written by Schwerin two weeks before his dismissal, on the subject of the Gehlen Organisation. Writing to Adenauer's foreign policy adviser in the Chancellor's Office, Herbert Blankenhorn, Schwerin pointed out that Gehlen's organisation was now in direct competition with the ›FWH-Service‹, run by Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz. He thought it inappropriate that a former general aspire to the leadership of a central intelligence organisation, particularly when he did not have the trust of the British or the French, and pointed out that the organisation had been built up too quickly and contained unreliable elements. Finally, it had been founded with the assistance of the US Army Counter Intelligence Corps and contained ›elements which were dependent on them‹. 62 Nevertheless, when all the available American intelligence material is considered, there seems little which suggests that either American military or intelligence officials were in any way involved in his dismissal, or that any alleged preference for British policy on rearmament and a ›border police solution‹ caused the American occupation authorities to recommend he be removed from office. The dismissal of Schwerin was an internal German affair, most likely -as Schwerin himself suspected -the result of a defamation campaign planned and carried out by the Gehlen Organisation. 6 The suggestion that Heinz was being funded by the British may also have been part of Gehlen's war against all those who stood in the way of his ambitions. 64 The fact Schwerin was to become a CIA operative only a few months after his dismissal by Adenauer also adds to the evidence that American intelligence had not concluded that he was clandestinely supporting British policy on rearmament.
III. Schwerin and the CIA, 1951-54
After his dismissal by Adenauer, Schwerin continued to remain resident in Bonn. Making use of the contacts he had established both in the Federal capital and among the Western Allies, he was involved in a range of activities which brought him into contact with both German politicians and Allied occupation officials. Moreover, despite the campaign which had been waged against him in Bonn, he was able to maintain strong links with the intelligence cell in the ›Blank Office‹, 65 the successor to the Zentrale für Heimatdienst, 66 while at the same time acting as an agent for the Central Intelligence Agency. Although his role as a CIA agent has so far received no attention from historians, and despite the dearth of detailed accounts of the work of the CIA in occupied Germany and its relations with the Counter Intel- At some point between his dismissal in late October 1950 and early January the following year, he received a request from ›Mr Hermsdorf‹ in Frankfurt/Main to give an account of the background to the abortive press conference which had led to his fall. 68 As a member of the US High Commissioner's ›information service‹, ›Hermsdorf‹ had already liaised with Schwerin, passing on information originating from the American intelligence services, when as Adenauer's security adviser the Count had been allowed access to the ›official as well as the confidential information service of the US Headquarters in Heidelberg‹. 69 Moreover, by the end of 1950 Schwerin must have appeared to have been a highly attractive partner for the CIA since, not only had American policy turned around in favour of rearmament, 70 the agency had become acutely aware of the political implications of creating German armed forces. In an official CIA report of mid-December 1950, with which the intelligence organisations of the Department of State, the army, navy and air force had concurred, one of the major concerns of Schwerin was repeated, namely, that the ›introduction of a German military organization into the present West German scene will pose serious problems for future German political development along democratic lines‹. 71 The fact that Schwerin could write on 26 August 1951, ›On Monday and Tuesday I will be travelling in the Ruhr area in order to place steel orders for the Italian company which produces the machine-guns for the Border Police‹, indicates clearly the degree of trust he continued to enjoy with the American military authorities. 72 Involvement in the ordering of weapons was in many ways a continuation of a meeting he had had with General Hays on 11 October 1950, while still serving as the head of the Zentrale für Heimatdienst. Then, Hays had discussed the options for arming the Federal border police with Schwerin, these being either producing the weapons in factories in the American zone, or transferring production to Swiss factories. 7 Further evidence of the confidence in him was the permission he re-
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In the available literature, there is little mention of the work of the CIA in Germany during the immediate post-war period, although the study originally produced for the Church Committee based on interviews and CIA historical studies is useful. It also emerges that a second visit which Schwerin made to England in July 1951 was undertaken with American support. Not only did he meet with leading British politicians John Hynd, Woodrow Wyatt, Brigadier A.R.W. Low and Lord Pakenham, but also Allen Dulles and Kenneth Strong. Upon his return, Schwerin was anxious that a meeting be arranged as soon as possible with Lieutenant-General Lucian K. Truscott, ›Special Consultant‹ to the US High Commissioner in Germany, so that he could report to him personally on a discussion which he had with Hervé Alphand, a French diplomatic official, over the concept of the Pleven Plan and his own views on French intentions. 75 On 21 July he communicated his impressions of the visit to the Federal government through an official in the Auswärtiges Amt. Not only did he go into considerable detail on the French fears of West German rearmament as explained by M. Alphand, he noted that many of their views were shared by his British guests. Two other points of significance were noted: first, Schwerin had met Kenneth Strong, and Allen Dulles (in London at the time), who had apparently complained strongly about Reinhard Gehlen's political ambitions and the competence of his organisation; second, Schwerin had also reported that Hynd had expressed worries about the negative attitude of the SPD to German rearmament and requested that he, Schwerin, try and use his influence with Kurt Schumacher.
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Proof of his employment by the CIA can be found in a document in his Counter Intelligence Corps file. Here it was also recorded that Schwerin, ›although no longer officially connected with the BLANK Office or any other Federal Government institution, is still actively engaged in advising certain governmental agencies, in particular the Federal Press and Information Office, on military problems past and future. He performs these services without remuneration.‹ It was noted that he was in the pay of the CIA, on a monthly salary of DM 750, with a further DM 700 for expenses. In addition, the CIA had provided him with a Volkswagen car, covering the petrol and repair costs as well. Apparently Schwerin had ›per-sonal contact with members of the CIA‹, access to General Truscott and undertook ›exploratory trips‹ for the agency. 77 The car must have been provided some time after August 1951, as he wrote to Hermsdorf towards the end of that month: ›I need a car urgently and if you cannot manage to get hold of one -which would naturally be the best way -I will have to try and procure one some other way.‹ 78 Quite apart from the pay and car, access to Truscott was of immense significance because the general's status as a ›special consultant‹ was simply a cover for his true role: The preservation of copies of Schwerin's expenses chits in his private papers, together with the reports he produced for ›Hermsdorf‹, allow a fairly accurate picture of the length and extent of his activities for the agency. The first report is dated 6 May 1951, the final report 2 February 195; the first claim for the reimbursement of expenses covers the period 29 May to 5 June 1951, the final one is dated 6 February 195. He produced in total fifty-four reports about -and based on -information from ›circles of former soldiers‹, in addition to many other reports on a wide variety of topics. 80 These intelligence collection activities concentrated on three principal areas. The first covered a range of issues connected with the practical implementation of rearmament. The second area of activity was intelligence policy and, in particular, his continuing critique of the Gehlen Organisation. The third field was the extremely important issue of veterans' politics; he met with veterans, tested their opinions and took a strong interest in the activities of the soldiers' associations and their political goals.
In terms of the first field, the practical implementation of rearmament, there are a number of reports on attitudes among German war veterans working for the British and American occupation forces in the ›service units‹.
81 Some make plain the sensitivity of the issue, not least of all because it represented an area of concern for the Blank Office; yet, at the same time, the service units were under the command of Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe, a clear reminder of Allied sovereignty over the Federal Republic in the field of security. 82 What is significant about these reports is that they show the service units were as much an issue of interest to the American occupation authorities, a corrective to the implication that they were seen only by the British as the core of a West German army in the event of a rapid escalation in tension with the East. 8 And, while Schwerin did occasionally engage in some of the more predictable fields of military intelligence, 84 when it came to the practicalities of rearmament his main focus was on its political and military viability. Hence, in one report on a visit to barracks of the Border Police in Lübeck, he noted that those who had been recruited wanted to serve as soldiers, not policemen. 85 In another two, on the attitude of German youth to the prospect of serving in a new army, he concluded that while agreeing in principle with rearmament the young men he had interviewed were ›critical and disillusioned‹, so it would be impossible to avoid ›a massive propaganda effort‹ in order to convince them of the necessity of rearmament. 86 On matters of intelligence policy, these were often discussed in his correspondence with ›Hermsdorf‹. Some letters made reference to the ›Gehlen problem‹ and warned ›Hermsdorf‹ about a whispering campaign being conducted against the head of the Amt für Verfassungsschutz, Dr Otto John. 87 Schwerin also laid down in memoranda his views on the dangers posed by the Gehlen Organisation for the new democratic system, its efforts to become involved in domestic politics and its desire to influence personnel decisions on the leading positions in the future armed forces. 88 Even in reports ostensibly reflecting the views of former frontline soldiers, criticisms of the way in which the Blank Office appeared to be being turned into a ›sub-office‹ of the Gehlen Organisation can be found. 89 In only two reports did he address issues relating to developments in the Eastern zone of Germany (ironically what might have been most expected from a CIA operative), notably views on the significance of the Volkspolizei, one report the result of a ten-day visit to West Berlin.
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If we turn to Schwerin's behind-the-scenes involvement in veterans' politics, it can be seen that, during the course of 1951, he made a number of suggestions to the American military authorities, and reported on attitudes among veterans and developments within specific organizations. The reasons for this interest, as he made clear in a report of April 1951, was the desire to control wilder and more dangerous elements, but at the same time to achieve a ›moral mobilization‹ of the large number of soldiers which would be necessary for the German contingent. As he noted: ›It should be made clear that every effort should be undertaken to ensure that the mass of former German soldiers do not come under the influence of Eastern-oriented, anti-Western or democratically unreliable elements.‹ 91 It is evident from his correspondence with his main collaborator among former generals in the field of veterans' politics, Leo Geyr von Schweppenburg, that he had made reports on veterans' affairs in 1951 to General Truscott; likewise, he was informed when material was passed directly to the US High Commissioner, John J. The worry about radical tendencies gaining ground among former soldiers was one of the main motivations behind a series of reports on the mood among veterans and in soldiers' organizations which Schwerin produced during 1951. These reports were based either on information from old regimental comrades, or his own ›field trips‹. In one of his first reports in early May 1951, he reported on the mood among veterans in Hamburg, Schleswig-Holstein and North Hanover. Schwerin noted that there was a general acceptance and willingness to take part in the defence of the West. Former soldiers, however, distrusted the Allies' strategic intentions and felt that the government in Bonn was completely unable to tackle the problem of rearmament. The issue of the ›so-called war criminals‹ was also of some significance, as the ordinary soldier found it ›incomprehensible‹ that German field-marshals and generals could be held in Allied prisons. Interesting is that, following this sketch of the opinions of former soldiers, Schwerin felt it necessary to state: ›The author of this report does not share all the opinions described in the above report. His intention was simply to give a blunt and honest picture of current attitudes. This was the task assigned to him.‹ 9 Still, he remarked a few weeks later that this report had had a ›sensational effect‹ on the Americans.
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What is interesting about these reports on veterans' attitudes is that while during May and June 1951 they usually took the form of a typical field agent's report, gradually they began to become a vehicle for Schwerin's views and recommendations and, subsequently, policy suggestions. The use of an intelligence report on veterans' views as a means of pushing his own ideas can be seen in a portrayal of a meeting with veterans aged between twenty-eight and thirty in Leverkusen on 26 June 1951. After assessing their willingness to take up arms again, Schwerin noted that ›all those present were in agreement‹ that a commander of the German contingent would have to be well-known and popular with the German people. Names such as von Vietinghoff, Halder, Speidel and Heusinger were dismissed as having little appeal, although it was noted that Heinz Guderian was a popular general whom the people would trust, who had a big heart for his soldiers and enjoyed great respect among former panzer-men. The report then claimed that the assembled soldiers had pointed out that Guderian had little political tact, no attachment to democracy and had been a loyal vassal of Hitler. Given that Schwerin had emphasised that a commanding general would have to possess the support of the Allies, it seems unlikely that the negative portrayal of Guderian actually originated from the soldiers themselves. 95 Despite the range of Schwerin's activities for the CIA and the US High Commission, by late 1951 his main focus had clearly become the issue of the veterans' associations. He was no stranger to the problems associated with the founding of these organisations since he had become involved in veterans' affairs while serving as Adenauer's security adviser. During the course of 1951 a combination of fac-MGZ 71 (2012) Alaric Searle tors -most notably, a relaxation in Allied laws governing the founding of such associations, the more likely prospect of rearmament, and hence the rising interest in the issue of ›so-called war criminals‹ -veterans became much more active in founding old comrades' organisations. Among these, the ›tradition associations‹ of larger formations, most notably the Großdeutschland Panzer Corps, the Africa Corps and the Paratroopers, generated intense interest from a security point of view. 96 Schwerin submitted reports to the CIA on the first reunions of the Großdeutsch-land and the Paratroopers' associations. In his report on the Großdeutschland meeting held in June 1951 in Kassel, he warned that there were certain elements within the organisation which would have to be watched. His report on the meeting of paratroopers, held in Braunschweig in late July, stated that, while there was a pronounced suspicion of political causes, the extreme right-wing Sozialistische Reichspartei might attempt to gain influence among these veterans. 97 It is interesting to note that the first report and others were passed to the Blank Office as well as to the CIA headquarters in Frankfurt; 98 and, there is evidence in Schwerin's correspondence that he was in close contact with Achim Oster, the head of the Blank Office's intelligence section. 99 This ›dual activity‹ was noticed by Counter Intelligence Corps officers, who learned from the source identified as P-909 that Schwerin had sent some of his reports to the shadow Defence Ministry in Bonn. This seems to have caused raised eyebrows among CIC officials, though not any undue alarm. 100 By late 1951, Schwerin had come to be more closely involved in Federal German initiatives to prevent the Verband deutscher Soldaten (VDS), founded on 21 September 1951, from hi-jacking the veterans' movement for extreme right-wing political purposes. After a disastrous press conference held by the first president of the association, ex-Generaloberst Hans Friessner, Schwerin seized the opportunity together with his main collaborator in veterans' politics, Geyr von Schweppenburg, to initiate a separate umbrella organisation. The first meeting in Goslar failed to gain support, however, after the rumour began to circulate that the event had been funded with government money. Still, Schwerin and Geyr did not give up and switched their attentions to a recently revived soldiers' organisation, the Kyffhäuser-bund, in an effort to continue their efforts against what they regarded as neo-Nazi elements. 101 Schwerin provided further warnings during 1952 to the CIA of the dangers presented not only by the veterans' associations, but also by the attitude of Adenauer's government which had started to promote the idea of a unified soldiers' organisation because they sought the veterans' support in the forthcoming political battle over rearmament; 102 and, he reported on the activities of the VDS and the efforts to turn the Kyffhäuserbund into a form of political counterweight. 10 The last report on the subject of the politics of the veterans' associations, produced by Schwerin for the CIA in October 1952, reflected the fact that the issue had lost some of its previous urgency. The Heimkehrerverband had turned away from its earlier neo-Nazi direction and, he noted, that while the ›tradition associations‹ continued to grow numerically they had little interest in politics; essentially their main concern was comradeship. Even in the Verband deutscher Soldaten, despite support provided by the FDP and the Deutsche Partei, the mass of former soldiers did not want the organisation to become involved in politics. 104 In his final four reports, three of which were written in February 195, he outlined the attitudes of former soldiers to the major political and international issues of the moment, particularly views on the hesitancy of the French towards the European Defence Community treaty and predictions on the results of the forthcoming Bundestag elections. 105 It is easy to see, though, that the value of Schwerin's information had by this time been seriously reduced as veterans had come to be perceived as less of a threat; 106 and, consequently, there were no more regular, paid reports for the CIA.
Still, the end of his report-writing may not have signalled the final conclusion to his contact with the agency. In a letter of May 195, written in English by Schwerin to a Mr Kern, identified as the Director General of Newsweek magazine (almost certainly an alias for an intelligence contact), the former general outlined once again his thoughts on the Gehlen Organisation. His principal recommendation was that a selected number of military personnel could be accepted into Federal service once they had been screened by members of the ›Blank Office‹, but that a German intelligence agency ought to be integrated into the European Defence Community. He also recommended the disbandment of Gehlen's domestic, foreign policy and economic intelligence branches, and the creation of a Central Intelligence Office as a sub-division of the Chancellor's Office which would be under the supervision of a senior civil servant. He concluded the letter by requesting that ›Mr Kern‹ pass on his regards to Allen Dulles and Kenneth Strong. 107 Was this a vain and last-gasp attempt by a discarded CIA operative to try and make use of influence which was no longer there -or, did he still have connections to Allen Dulles? Another document provides an interesting angle on this question, a report for the Gehlen Organisation from March 1954 which was based on information supplied by Hans Speidel. Returning from a trip to the United States and Britain, Schwerin had told Speidel on 2 March 1954 that his host had been Allen Dulles who had wanted to hear his opinion of the Gehlen Organisation. Schwerin had told him that Hans Globke (the civil servant seen by Schwerin as ›Gehlen's man‹ in the Bundeskanzleramt) and Adenauer had misused the organisation for domestic political purposes. He noted that he had had many conversations with Fritz Erler, a leading Social Democratic member of the Bundestag, on the subject. 108 That Schwerin was still spreading warnings about the activities of the Gehlen Organisation is hardly surprising. The full significance of Schwerin's CIA contacts only becomes fully apparent, however, when his conversations and correspondence with West German politicians are examined.
IV. Adviser to Federal Politicians, 1951-56
It was not simply through report-writing for the CIA that Schwerin was active in providing advice on rearmament and its intelligence dimensions. During his time as Adenauer's security adviser he had got to know the politicians Kurt Schumacher, Waldemar von Knoerringen and Heinrich Brüning. 109 Knoerringen had introduced Schwerin to Schumacher because he thought the general was ›a completely new type of soldier‹ who was serious about breaking with the old traditions. 110 Views expressed by Schumacher to Schwerin during a two-hour meeting on 7 June 1950 were communicated to Adenauer, 111 while meetings also took place between Schumacher and Schwerin on 2, 4 and 14 September and 4 and 10 October. 112 A meeting on 18 September between Schwerin and Alfred Gleisner, a member of the Bundestag, which had taken place on Schumacher's instructions, had though led to press reports suggesting that Schwerin's contact with the SPD politician showed that the opposition and the government were cooperating on the issue of the creation of a Federal police force, reports which must have irritated Adenauer. 11 But, even after his dismissal from government service, Schwerin continued to meet with Federal German politicians and high-ranking Allied occupation officials.
Despite his role as a CIA agent, the extent of Schwerin's access to Allied occupation officials, not to mention his meetings with prominent West German politicians, is still surprising. His CIC file provides some indication of the range of these contacts. It was reported in May 1952, for example, that he had visited an official at the US High Commissioner's Office, accompanied by former tank general Leo Geyr von Schweppenburg, ›in order to warn him of the dangers that might be embodied in unqualified German remilitarization.‹ 114 On the afternoon of 17 July 1952, Schwerin took part in ›an important meeting‹ of SPD parliamentary deputies relating to the parliamentary supervision of the Blank Office. 115 Moreover, it was also recorded that on 9 August 1952 he had attended a meeting in a private room of the Bonn Rowing Club with French military officials. 116 Most striking is the way in which Schwerin's recommendations to the American occupation authorities, through his activities as a CIA agent, were repeated to leading Federal German politicians in various memoranda and personal meetings. Schwerin clearly made the most of his ›previous service as the military adviser in the Federal Chancellor's Office‹ which gave him ›certain experience and insight [...] which no other soldier possesses‹. At the same time, he did not back any one political party at this stage, declaring that he felt himself to be ›politically independent and responsible only to the people‹, and ›responsible towards the common frontline soldier, regardless of whether he be an officer or an ordinary soldier‹.
On 28 March 1951 Schwerin charged one of his former military subordinates with the task of conveying to Schumacher on his behalf a series of thoughts relating to rearmament. At the following meeting on 5 April, the go-between outlined Schwerin's belief in the need for a people's army, but with a 20 % core of professional soldiers, his views on the problem of those veterans who it would not be possible to integrate into the new armed forces, on the Gehlen Organisation and, finally, on the speed with which the Russians were likely to develop a nuclear device. Schumacher noted that, for the SPD, ›how‹ rearmament would be approached would not be on the agenda until the issue of ›whether‹ rearmament should take place had been settled. On the question of the political ambitions of the Gehlen Organisation, Schumacher showed himself to be ›extraordinarily interested‹ and requested further information as soon as possible.
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On 2 April, Schwerin outlined in considerable detail what he knew about the Gehlen Organisation to his go-between. The information was then communicated to Schumacher in a meeting on 0 May 1951. Schwerin had passed on nothing short of a damning indictment of the activities of Reinhard Gehlen's organisation. He accused Gehlen of posing as a reformer in the field of intelligence, but equated his drive for centralisation as a dangerous political route, one which had led British intelligence to drop Gehlen like a hot potato. In the one-and-a-half-hour conversation with Schumacher, it was reported that the SPD leader had stated that he did not want the organisation integrated into the Federal state apparatus and it was communicated to Schwerin that Schumacher had become more open to a discussion of ›how‹ rearmament should be prepared. 120 It does not appear, though, that any other meetings took place prior to Schumacher's death on 20 August 1952. Still, this did not mean the end of Schwerin's contact with the SPD since he enjoyed good relations with one of its leading security experts, Fritz Erler. 121 Erler clearly valued his contact with both Schwerin and Geyr von Schweppenburg, as both were willing to criticise the government's defence policy and were able to do so on the basis of their military experience. Geyr's views on ›a far too conservative approach to the inner spirit [of the new military] and a too one-sided personnel policy‹ not only accorded with Schwerin's opinions, but also those of Erler and the Social Democrats. Geyr probably also spoke for Schwerin when he wrote to Erler on 21 November 1952: ›Among the younger politicians in the Bundestag, I believe to have recognised so far two with a natural instinct and clear concept on fundamental military questions, these are Strauß and yourself.‹
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The basis for the cooperation between Schwerin and Strauß was laid in September 1951. The main subjects under consideration were -not surprisingly -those areas which were the subject of Schwerin's reflections in his reports for the CIA: veterans' associations, parliamentary control of the Blank Office, whether or not the creation of a Ministry of Defence was desirable and a range of other issues raised by rearmament. 12 Schwerin was obviously impressed by the young Bavarian politician. He confided in May 1952 to Hans Speier, an academic and consultant to the US State Department, that he regarded Strauß as one of the few parliamentary deputies willing to make an effort to ensure the creation of a democratic army. 124 While it is not clear exactly how often Schwerin met with Strauß in the following four years, copies of Schwerin's letters and memoranda to the politician have survived in the general's personal papers. Particularly interesting in the correspondence is the frequency with which intelligence issues were raised by Schwerin.
In a letter of October 1951 to Dr W.H. Scheidt, an associate of Strauß through whom the initial contact with the Bavarian politician was established, Schwerin mentioned what he feared were ›justified accusations‹ against Otto John. In a letter the following month, he raised several issues surrounding parliamentary control of the Gehlen Organisation. He suggested that the organisation be integrated organisationally into the planned European Army, that domestic security become the exclusive preserve of the Amt für Verfassungsschutz and that Reinhard Gehlen be forced to give up his ›branch offices‹ in Bonn and the regional states. He warned that, above all, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution and the Gehlen Organisation ought to complement not compete with one another. He closed the letter by stating that he would like to discuss ›this important and unfortunately very thorny subject‹ after his return from a ten-day trip to southern Germany. 125 In December 1951, Schwerin began to write to Strauß personally, informing him of developments within veterans' organisations, suggested meetings with individuals with specialist knowledge of military affairs and reported on internal developments within the Blank Office. This line of communication was, moreover, not only in one direction; 126 and, Schwerin also sought on occasions to use his influence with the US occupation authorities on Strauß's behalf. 127 But his worries about the activities of the Gehlen Organisation and their possible effects remained a prominent subject.
In a memorandum for Strauß of August 1952, Schwerin reported that it had not been possible for more moderate generals to gain employment in the Blank Office. More alarmingly, he had ›very reliable information‹ that in a conversation with Theodor Blank Gehlen had stated that he had received confirmation from the highest political authority that it had been decided that his organisation, the Amt für Verfassungsschutz, and the ›FWH Service‹ within the Blank Office, would be placed under a unified command in which he would be the leading figure. Schwerin warned that were this to take place the Federal Republic would be advised by a US-financed intelligence service, and that a complete integration of the Gehlen Organisation into the state apparatus would bring individuals into positions of responsibility, such as former SD and OKW/OKH members, who were not predisposed to basic democratic principles. Schwerin concluded that demands would have to be made that the Gehlen Organisation be restricted to military intelligence work, that domestic security would remain the preserve of the Verfassungsschutz, and that the Chancellor be provided with a secret service chief who could guarantee the independence of the political and military intelligence being supplied to the Federal government. 128 When placed within the wider intelligence context, this communication to Strauß is quite remarkable. At a time when he was in the pay of the CIA, and reporting to the agency's German headquarters in Frankfurt, Schwerin was simultaneously warning a leading West German politician of the dangers of an intelligence service which the CIA had been funding since 1 July 1949. 129 His CIA contact was, nonetheless, fully informed by Schwerin of the cooperation with Strauß. 10 It does in fact seem as if Strauß did give some credence to Schwerin's warnings; after all, his memoirs show him not to have been overly impressed with the capabilities of the Gehlen Organisation. 11 And, as it turned out, although Gehlen appeared to have won the upper hand in 195 when Friedrich Wilhelm Heinz was dismissed on 1 October, reinforced by the Otto John defection scandal in July 1954, the political tide gradually began to turn against Gehlen, and his plans to take full control of Federal intelligence were slowly worn down by strong parliamentary resistance.
for future civil-military relations, Schwerin's knowledge of developments indicated just how good his contacts in the Blank Office were. 1 In January 195, he reported that the French general Edgard de Larminat had collated material made available to him by German citizens in order to prepare a case against the European Defence Community Treaty. In the same month, he sent a note to Strauß that a ›member of the CIA reported to me‹ that the new American government would not use Berlin as an ›object to barter with‹ when it came to negotiating peace in Korea. 14 Schwerin's ability to pass on to Franz Josef Strauß secret material, drawn from Federal German and American intelligence sources, was obviously an attempt to secure access to the rising young star in Bonn, a man who had by 195 already carved out something of a niche for himself in security politics. The fact that Schwerin could draw on intelligence sources, combined with his own firm grasp of military affairs, clearly made him an important contact for the burly Bavarian, although Schwerin's papers indicate that the flow of information to Strauß appears to have petered out by early 1954. 15 The contact did not break off completely, however. In mid-1954, Schwerin sent Strauß a paper outlining his views on the future defence of the Federal Republic of Germany. The existence of the paper was registered by US Army intelligence, as attested to by an entry in Schwerin's CIC file. 16 He also produced other memoranda in 1954, including detailed suggestions on parliamentary control of the Federal Republic's intelligence services and on developments in weapons procurement. 17 While there appears to have been no contact between Schwerin and Strauß in 1955, when the latter became Minister of Defence in October 1956 Schwerin reappeared as an adviser. It is worth noting that in his memoirs Strauß did not seem very anxious to acknowledge their previous contact, merely commenting that on becoming Minister of Defence he had contacted Schwerin so the general could advise him on questions relating to the Border Police. 18 There is little correspondence through which further conclusions can be drawn, other than a draft of a letter by Schwerin to Strauß in which the former general refers to a meeting between the two and thanks the minister for ›the trust which you have once again shown towards me‹. 19 But two memoranda from October 1956 are clearly addressed to the new Minister of Defence and provide evidence that Strauß did use Schwerin once again as an adviser. 140 Strauß never called Schwerin to serve in the Bundeswehr, however, although the latter had passed the Personnel Screening Board. While other considerations may also have played a role, it could be speculated that -from Strauß's perspective -Schwerin quite simply knew too much. 141 
V. Conclusion
This account of the post-war intelligence career of Count Gerhard von Schwerin has shown conclusively that the claim that the press conference on 19 October 1950 ›led to the final point of the short second career of the Count, whom Adenauer had wanted rid of for some time‹, 142 is unsustainable in the face of the documentary record. Schwerin's intelligence activities involved the founding of the two intelligence cells in the Zentrale für Heimatdienst, later active support for their operations after they were integrated into the Amt Blank, acting as a CIA operative and advising several key Federal politicians on intelligence policy. That he was involved for a longer period than has hitherto been realised in alerting both the Western Allies and Federal politicians to his fears about the Gehlen Organisation suggests that this on-going critique may well have contributed to the failure of Gehlen's plans for control of Federal intelligence. His close cooperation with the American military and the CIA certainly calls into question the implication by some historians that Schwerin was a minor figure, viewed as not very capable by US military officers and Federal officials in Bonn. 14 Needless to say, the most important controversy in relation to Schwerin's intelligence work and contacts in 1950 is the proposition that he was too close to British intelligence and, hence, this contributed to Adenauer's decision to sack him. While he did enjoy good relations with British intelligence, the available evidence does not sustain the accusation that Schwerin was acting on the instructions of the British, either in his pursuit of rearmament or in his battle against the Gehlen Organisation. Indeed, recently released secret service documents suggest strongly that British intelligence had not only meagre information on Gehlen, but that they were more dismissive of his intelligence abilities than worried about his organisation. 144 The suspicion that Schwerin was a ›British plant‹ does seem to have con-cerned the US Army Counter Intelligence Corps in mid-1950; but information provided by agents implies the claim was unfounded. 145 Moreover, the fact that by May 1951 he was in the employment of the CIA makes it unlikely that either CIC or the CIA conspired with German intelligence circles to drive him from office, not least of all as Schwerin's CIC file indicates that the Americans were unaware in mid-October 1950 that he was to be dismissed. 146 What is interesting about the documents which can be found in Schwerin's papers is not only his criticism of the dependency of the Gehlen Organisation on elements of CIC, but also his simultaneous warnings to the CIA of the dangers of an organisation which it had, itself, been funding. How seriously, then, were Schwerin's views taken by the CIA? Given that the official role of the CIA at the time was the coordination of US intelligence and the production of ›national intelligence‹, defined as being intelligence of an inter-departmental nature, Schwerin obviously enjoyed a highly privileged position for a former German general within the US intelligence apparatus in occupied Germany. When it is recalled that in the first months of 1950 there was still considerable dissatisfaction in Washington over the failure by the CIA to avoid duplication of effort, it can be seen that the agency was still finding its feet as an organisation in mid-1950. 147 But with the arrival of Lucian Truscott in February 1951, the CIA in Germany became a crucial part of the organisation as a whole. Considering that Truscott was the supervisor of all CIA activities in Germany, and responsible for the budget and coordination of its activities with all other American intelligence agencies in Germany, with a staff of 1,400, the full significance of his role becomes clear. 148 Access to Truscott presented Schwerin with remarkable opportunities for influence in intelligence matters, while the trust he was accorded in particular tasks gave him a considerable degree of independence. His role highlights, in fact, the way in which it was difficult at the time to separate the functions of agent, report writer and military adviser from one another.
MGZ 71 (2012) Alaric Searle Schwerin's intelligence activities have, at the same time, some significance for the history and the style of politics in the Federal Republic in the first half of the 1950s. As the discussions and communications between Schwerin and Schumacher, Erler and Strauß illustrate, political assessments of a subject as crucial as rearmament were significantly influenced by the outlook, practice and methods of intelligence agencies. The intelligence work conducted by Schwerin shows that a good deal of policy-making and informal advising in the early Federal Republic took place within an atmosphere and overall political context in which secret service methods and contacts were of paramount importance. In the ›semi-sovereign state‹ which was the Federal Republic of Germany in the period 1949-56, 150 a world of rumour and informal contacts, which included the importance of maintaining good relations with Allied officials, characterised political activity.
This missing chapter in the biography of Schwerin has, finally, implications for the conclusions drawn in the 2007 report on the events of 1 September 1944 in Aachen which, perhaps inevitably, viewed the events of that day as almost the key to Schwerin's biography. It must be apparent from this analysis, however, that the report writers have not explained convincingly just why the Western Allies were so certain of Schwerin's anti-Nazi credentials -indeed, that they regarded him as almost unique among German generals -since this impression was not based solely on a positive interpretation of his behaviour in Aachen in September 1944. 151 Of course, the extent to which his outlook during the war conformed to an essentially anti-Nazi world view is a question which will have to await the publication of a rigorously researched biography. But given his subsequent failure to secure a post in the new German armed forces, it was probably inevitable that in later life he would seek some form of recognition for his efforts to support democratic renewal. Since he could not discuss in public his collaboration with the British and American intelligence services, the acclaim Schwerin sought as the ›Retter von Aachen‹ may have merely acted as a substitute in his own mind for the recognition he thought he was actually due -that of the man who had continued to warn of the dangers posed by Reinhard Gehlen.
the same time the latitude he enjoyed within the US intelligence structure cannot be so easily reconciled with the emphasis on bureaucratic organisations in the theory. See Michael Herman, Intelligence Power in Peace and War (Cambridge, 1996) 
